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WHO SHOULD PAY FOR THE ERRORS OF THE 
TRIBAL AGENT?: WHY COURTS SHOULD 
ENFORCE CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS OF TRIBAL 
IMMUNITY WHEN AN AGENT EXCEEDS HER 
AUTHORITY UNDER TRIBAL LAW 
Adam Keith* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As tribal commercial enterprises have expanded the size and scope of 
their operations, the business of tribes has become the business of the 
nation.  The commercial interests of large tribes such as the Navajo now 
run the gamut from energy to tourism to industrial activities.
1
  Moreover, 
gaming interests held by all tribes nationwide produced revenues of 
$26,482,447,000 in 2009, according to the National Indian Gaming 
Commission.
2
 
When tribal commercial organizations engage in commercial dealings, 
their non-tribal counterparties almost universally insist that a waiver of 
tribal immunity be included within any contractual agreement so as to 
retain their access to state and federal courts should they decide to litigate 
any commercial disputes against the tribal entity.
3
  In a recent case, the 
Sixth Circuit weakened the reliability of these waivers by ruling that the 
court will not enforce such a waiver when a tribal agent assents to one 
while possessing only apparent authority in the eyes of the tribal 
 
        *  Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2012. Special 
thanks to Professor Catherine Struve for her indispensable guidance throughout the 
production of this comment and to the editors who helped to prepare this comment for 
publication.  
 1. See Amanda J. Crawford, A Bond Offering from the Navajo Nation, BUSINESSWEEK, 
Nov. 14, 2011, at 53–54 (noting the variety of enterprises which would be financed by a 
tribal bond offering). 
 2. NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, NIGC TRIBAL GAMING REVENUES, 
http://www.nigc.gov/Gaming_Revenue_Reports.aspx (follow “Gaming Revenues 2006–
2010” hyperlink). 
 3. Amelia A. Fogleman, Note, Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes: A Proposal for 
Statutory Waiver for Tribal Businesses, 79 VA. L. REV. 1345, 1365 (1993). 
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counterparty but not actual authority under tribal law.
4
  This comment will 
argue that there are three reasons that courts should enforce such waivers: 
because doing so is consistent with the principles associated with waivers 
of tribal immunity; because it will not have deleterious effects on tribal 
sovereignty; and because it will improve the efficiency of tribal 
commercial dealings with non-tribal entities. 
For purposes of brevity and clarity this comment will use the term 
“erroneous waiver” to refer to cases in which a tribal agent agreed to a 
waiver of tribal immunity while possessing apparent authority but not 
while possessing necessary authorization under tribal law to constitute 
actual authority. 
This comment will consist of four parts.  Part I includes this 
introduction and definitions of relevant terminology.  Part II will discuss 
the background of tribal immunity and of the treatment of waivers of tribal 
immunity.  Part III will discuss the legal basis for enforcement of erroneous 
waivers of tribal immunity.  Part IV will discuss the policy implications of 
adopting a standard that enforces erroneous waivers of tribal immunity. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Although tribal immunity has deep roots in the nation’s legal history, 
the Supreme Court did not officially acknowledge its development until 
well into the 20th century. The concept of tribal immunity first originated 
in the 1850 Supreme Court decision of Parks v. Ross.
5
  In a later case, the 
Supreme Court cited Turner v. United States and Creek Nation of Indians 
as the modern source of the doctrine of tribal immunity.
6
  Tribal immunity 
was subsequently fully endorsed by the Court in United States v. United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
7
 and remains in place to this day
8
 despite 
occasional questioning of its continued utility among some judges.
9
  
 
 4. Memphis Biofuels v. Chickasaw Nation Industries Inc., 585 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
 5. Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362 (1850).  See also Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity 
and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 137, 148 (2004) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
history of recognizing tribal sovereign immunity). 
 6. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998) (citing 
Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919)). 
 7. United States v. U.S. Fid. Guar. Corp., 309 U.S. 506 (1940). 
 8. Catherine T. Struve, The Story of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal 
Sovereignty, Sex Equality, and the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL COURT STORIES, 321 (Vicki 
C. Jackson ed., 2010). 
 9. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756–58 (writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
questioned the validity of the legal origins of the doctrine of tribal immunity before 
ultimately affirming it). 
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Despite this questioning, both Congress and the Supreme Court have 
affirmed federal recognition of tribal immunity.
10
 
The terminology of waiver can be both complex and inconsistent.  
Although different courts and commentators use different terminology,
11
 
for the sake of simplicity this comment will refer to the court’s opinion in 
Memphis Biofuels as the basis for delineating the terminology of waivers of 
tribal immunity.  The court’s opinion points to two notable distinctions.  
Waivers of tribal immunity can be either automatic or express.
12
  While 
automatic waivers occur because of an involuntary status of a tribal 
corporation—such as incorporation of a tribal commercial organization 
under Section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act
13
—express waivers can 
only occur as result of a deliberate action by a tribal organization.
14
  The 
court’s opinion in Memphis Biofuels also indicates that waivers can either 
be specific or general.
15
  While specific waivers remove immunity only 
with respect to a unique transaction or relationship, general waivers 
typically absolve all immunity for a tribal organization—for example, 
through a broad “sue or be sued” clause in its incorporating charter.
16
  More 
specifically still, this comment will deal with waivers that are not only 
specific and express but also that are erroneous in that the agent assenting 
 
 10. See Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a 
Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 664–66 (2002) 
(discussing the jurisprudential and political background to the Court’s decision to uphold the 
doctrine of tribal immunity in Kiowa Tribe).  See generally Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Self-
Determination in the Age of Scarcity, 54 S.D. L. REV. 398, 400–01 (2009) (discussing tribal 
immunity in the context of the nation’s declining economic fortunes and the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s inclination to reshape . . . tribal sovereignty by 
abandoning a formalistic adherence to these foundational principles . . . for a 
more functional approach involving a complex balancing of state and tribal 
political interests, with the scale tipping . . . in favor of the state’s interests . . . 
). 
 11. Cf. C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 
420–23 (2001) (which did not make specific terminological distinctions as to different types 
of waiver as did the court in Memphis Biofuels). 
 12. Memphis Biofuels v. Chickasaw Nation Industries Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 920–23 (6th 
Cir. 2009). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. (noting that while incorporation under section 17 could theoretically 
completely divest a tribal entity of its immunity, an express waiver in this context would 
only have waived immunity for the purposes of this transaction). 
 15. See id. at 920–22 (the court’s opinion does not explicitly use the terminology of 
general versus specific waver but does note the distinction between these two varieties of 
waiver). 
 16. Id. 
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to the unique waiver in an individual commercial relationship did not have 
the authority to do so under tribal law.
17
 
Under the current operative interpretation, tribal immunity exempts 
tribal organizations from suit in federal, state and tribal courts,
18
 and 
applies to both commercial and non-commercial tribal activities, both on 
and off reservation.
19
  While courts have broadly upheld tribal immunity, 
they have recognized several circumstances in which tribes can waive their 
immunity.
20
  In Memphis Biofuels, the Sixth Circuit noted that some courts 
have construed tribes as having waived their immunity through an 
automatic waiver under Section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act— 
through general express waiver in the form of “sue or be sued” clauses 
included within charter,
21
 or through specific express waiver in the form of 
contractual arrangements with counterparties in commercial 
arrangements.
22
  While some courts have claimed that automatic waiver 
exists when a tribal organization is incorporated under Section 17 of the 
Indian Reorganization Act,
23
 the court in Memphis Biofuels disagreed and 
noted that the Supreme Court’s 1998 holding in Kiowa Tribe, concluding 
that tribal immunity exists under federal common law unless specifically 
abrogated by Congress, likely invalidated previous rulings by lower courts 
holding that incorporation under Section 17 could implicitly waive tribal 
immunity.
24
 
By comparison, the issue of general express waiver is less settled; 
some circuits state that clauses within tribal incorporating documents 
holding that the tribal entity declares broad power to “sue and be sued” 
completely waive tribal immunity, while others hold the opposite.
25
  
 
 17. But cf. id. (however, Memphis Biofuels labeled what this comment refers to as 
erroneous waivers under the heading of “equitable doctrines.”). 
 18. Seielstad, supra note 10, at 699–700. 
 19. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754–55 (1998). 
 20. But cf. Seielstad, supra note 10, at 699 (noting some instances in which tribes have 
no choice but to waive their immunity stating that the Indian Tribal Economic Development 
and Contract Encouragement Act, enacted by Congress in 2000, effectively forced tribes to 
waive immunity in certain special circumstances such as if a commercial immunity would 
require an encumbrance of tribal lands lasting longer than 7 years). 
 21. See Memphis Biofuels v. Chickasaw Nation Industries Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 920 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (noting that Section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act allowed that “The 
Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by any tribe, issue a charter of incorporation to 
such tribe” with respect to creation of a tribal commercial entity). 
 22. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754–55. 
 23. GNS Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 866 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (N.D. Iowa, 
1994) 
 24. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 920–21. 
 25. WILLIAM C. CANBY JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 111 (5th ed. 2009).  
See also Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp. v. Malaterre, 633 F.3d 680, 687–88 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(ruling that a provision in the charter of a tribal corporation stating that it would “assume the 
obligations and liabilities” of a successor corporation was not sufficient to waive tribal 
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Although this remains an unsettled issue, many courts are able to avoid the 
problem altogether since many tribes choose not to include such clauses in 
the incorporating charters of their tribal commercial organizations and are 
thus never subject questions concerning the general express waiver of their 
tribal immunity.
26
 
Although courts differ in determining how unambiguous a specific 
waiver of tribal immunity must be in order to be enforced by the court,
27
 all 
now follow the legal consensus that tribes have the ability to waive tribal 
immunity in individual transactions with non-tribal entities.
28
  Nevertheless, 
in the course of commercial transactions, tribal representatives sometimes 
overstep their authority by agreeing to waivers of tribal immunity, and non-
tribal entities sometimes mistakenly believe the tribal agents to possess 
sufficient authority to waive immunity.  The majority view among courts 
that have dealt with this issue is that a waiver of tribal immunity should not 
be enforced if the agent exceeded his authority under tribal law by granting 
the waiver in question.
29
  Such courts frequently cite the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, holding that a waiver of tribal 
immunity “cannot be implied and must be unequivocally expressed” in 
support of this opinion.
30
 However, the court in Memphis Biofuels did note 
 
immunity). 
 26. See Memphis Biofuels v. Chickasaw Nation Industries Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 921–22 
(6th Cir. 2009) (noting that, unlike the incorporating documents of some tribal organization, 
the incorporating document of Chickasaw Nations Industries did not contain a broad “sue 
and be sued clause”). 
 27. Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assoc. Inc., 86 F.3d 656, 
660 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 28. See Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 922 (noting that tribes have the ability to waive 
immunity for the purposes of a single transaction). 
 29. Id. (citing all the following authorities in support of their ruling); World Touch 
Gaming, Inc. v. Massena Mgmt., 117 F. Supp. 2d. 271, 275–76, (N.D.N.Y. 2000).  Cf. 
Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1295 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(ruling that the false statement by a tribal official that the tribe itself waived immunity 
through a “a sue or be sued” clause in the charter of its corporation entity did not equitably 
estop the tribe from claiming tribal immunity); Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 243 
F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001) (ruling that the Chief of the Seminole tribe did not affect 
automatic waiver of the Seminole tribe’s immunity by accepting federal funding since he 
did not have the authority to waive immunity under the tribal constitution).  See also 
Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. Pilchuck Group II, No. C10-995RAJ, 2011 WL 4001088 
at *6 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 7, 2011) (citing Memphis Biofuels in support of its ruling that 
authority to waive tribal immunity is defined by tribal law or, when tribal law is silent, 
federal common law, not state common law principles of agency); Colombe v. Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe, No. CIV 11-3002-RAL, 2011 WL 3654412 at *8 (D. S.D. Aug. 17, 2011) 
(citing Memphis Biofuels in support of its rulings that tribal immunity waivers are not 
effective if they do not comply with tribal law); Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 2011 OK 
61, 258 P.3d 516, 519–20, ¶¶ 15–16 (citing Memphis Biofuels to support its ruling that tribal 
immunity cannot be waived if the circumstances of the supposed waiver violate tribal law). 
 30. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). 
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the existence of a minority approach whereby an erroneous waiver of 
immunity would be enforced when the tribal agent possessed apparent 
authority in the view of the non-tribal counterparty.
31
 
The crux of the disagreement between the minority and majority 
courts with respect to the enforceability of an erroneous waiver of tribal 
immunity is whether courts should give effect to a waiver when a claimant 
can prove that the tribe’s agent had apparent authority to waive immunity 
but did not possess actual authority to do so under tribal law.
32
  Under the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency, apparent authority is defined as, “the 
power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations 
with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has 
authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the 
principal’s manifestations.”
33
  While courts following the majority view 
have held that such apparent authority is not sufficient to bind the tribe to a 
waiver of tribal immunity, courts following the minority view have held the 
opposite.
34
 
The Colorado Court of Appeals provided a framework for applying 
the theory of apparent authority to the question of when to enforce 
erroneous waivers of tribal authority in Rush Creek Solutions Inc. v. Ute 
Mountain Ute Tribe.
35
  In that case, the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled 
that the determination of whether to enforce an erroneous waiver should be 
focused around the fact-intensive question of whether the principal created 
apparent authority through “written or spoken words or other conduct of 
the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes a person to believe that 
the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by a person 
 
 31. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 922 (citing Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute 
Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 407–08 (Colo. App. 2004)).  
 32. The Restatement (Third) of Agency defines actual authority, “[a]n agent acts with 
actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the 
principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to 
the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 2.01 (2006). 
 33. Id. § 2.03. 
 34. Compare Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 922 (holding that a contract between 
Chickasaw Nation Industries and a non-tribal counterparty did not waive tribal immunity 
because only a waiver that complied with the requirement for board approval under tribal 
law could be effective) and World Touch Gaming, Inc. v. Massena Mgmt., 117 F. Supp. 2d. 
271, 275–76, (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that a management company acting as an agent of 
the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe could not bind the tribe to an agreement with a contractor 
waiving tribal immunity where tribal law held that only the Tribal Council had the authority 
to grant an immunity waiver) with Rush Creek Solutions v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 
P.3d 402, 407–08 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that an immunity waiver signed by the tribal 
CFO would be enforced by the court even though it potentially did not comply with the 
tribal constitution). 
 35. Rush Creek Solutions, 107 P.3d at 407–08. 
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purporting to act for him.”
36
  Federal courts and other state courts could 
easily use this standard of apparent authority when determining whether to 
give effect to an erroneous waiver. 
This comment will argue that courts should adopt the minority 
viewpoint that tribes should be bound by agents who agree to waivers of 
tribal immunity while possessing apparent but not actual authority. This 
comment will argue that doing so would promote economic efficiency in 
tribal commercial ventures and would be consistent with the principals of 
tribal sovereignty, as well as with previous Supreme Court rulings dealing 
with waivers of tribal immunity. 
III.  LEGAL BASIS FOR ENFORCING ERRONEOUS WAIVERS 
Although the status of the enforceability of erroneous waivers remains 
a contentious and unsettled issue, substantial authority exists to support the 
proposition that courts should give effect to such waivers.  This authority 
stems from Supreme Court and Circuit Court rulings which have adopted a 
narrow formulation of the unambiguous statement requirement from Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court’s ruling in C&L Enters. v. 
Citizen Band Potawatomi clarifying the limited applications of the Court’s 
deference to Congress with respect to tribal immunity matters noted in 
Kiowa, and the example provided by waivers of sovereign immunity in the 
context of foreign sovereign immunity. 
A.  Reconciling the enforcement of specific erroneous waivers with the 
unambiguous statement requirement 
While the Sixth Circuit ruling in Memphis Biofuels v. Chickasaw 
Nation Industries was the highest court to rule directly on the issue of 
enforceability of specific erroneous waivers, it did not make any new 
arguments in support of this opinion, but rather relied on direct citation to 
earlier rulings that had come to similar conclusions.
37
  Although the Court 
did not specifically articulate the basis for its ruling on this point, all the 
cited cases invalidated erroneous waivers on the basis of the unambiguous 
statement requirement.
38
  Moreover, the petitioner’s brief, which supported 
the position ultimately adopted by the court that erroneous waivers are not 
sufficient to abrogate tribal immunity, cited the preceding cases to prove 
 
 36. Id. at 407 (quoting Lucero v. Goldberger, 84 P.2d. 206, 209 (Colo. App. 1990)). 
 37. See Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 921–22 (relying primarily on a string cite of 
supporting cases to support its holding that an unauthorized agent of Chickasaw Nations 
Industries could not waive immunity through apparent authority). 
 38. See infra notes 40 and 41. 
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the proposition that waivers were invalid under the unambiguous statement 
requirement.
39
 
Some of the opinions cited by the court in Memphis Biofuels, such as 
Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida and Native American Distributing v. 
Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Company, dealt not with specific erroneous 
waivers but with general or automatic erroneous waivers.
40
  Reviewing 
courts should note the significant differences between specific, general, and 
automatic erroneous waivers and decline to hold such cases to be pertinent 
to the context of specific erroneous waivers.  Other cases cited by Memphis 
Biofuels rely on the broad reading of the Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo 
requirement enunciated in World Touch v. Massena and Danka v. Sky City 
to rule that the unambiguous statement requirement forbids the 
enforcement of immunity waivers when the tribal agent possessed apparent 
but not actual authority to assent to the waiver.
41
  Reviewing courts could 
enforce specific erroneous waivers despite the standard enunciated in 
World Touch and Danka by noting the trend towards the narrower readings 
of the unambiguous statement requirement, and by citing the example of 
the Colorado Court of Appeals ruling in Rush Creek Solutions stating that 
enforcement of specific erroneous waivers is not barred by the 
unambiguous statement requirement.
42
 
Unlike general or automatic waiver, specific waiver carries a smaller 
risk of unintentional waiver by a tribal representative.  A tribal official 
could easily initiate an unintentional general or automatic waiver by 
accepting federal funding or including a “sue or be sued” clause without 
anticipating potential consequences of these actions in federal courts.  In 
contrast, a specific waiver would come in the context of explicit contractual 
negotiations.  Tribal officials would be more likely to anticipate the 
potential that contractual stipulations could waive tribal immunity than to 
anticipate the same with a federal grant application or a general provision 
within a tribal constitution, and would therefore be able take greater care in 
avoiding an accidental waiver of tribal immunity.
43
 
 
 39. Brief of Appellee, Memphis Biofuels v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 
917 (6th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-6145). 
 40. Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 243 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(ruling that accepting federal funds was not sufficiently unequivocal to constitute a valid 
waiver of tribal immunity); Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 
1288, 1295 (10th Cir. 2008) (ruling that the false statement by a tribal official that the tribe 
itself waived immunity through a “a sue or be sued” clause in the charter of its corporation 
entity did not equitably estop the tribe from claiming tribal immunity). 
 41. World Touch Gaming, Inc. v. Massena Mgmt., 117 F. Supp. 2d. 271, 275–76, 
(N.D.N.Y. 2000); Danka Funding Co., LLC v. Sky City Casino, 747 A. 2d 837, 841 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999). 
 42. Rush Creek Solutions v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 408 (Colo. App. 
2004). 
 43. Heidi M. Staudenmeier & Metchi Palaiappan, Intersection of Corporate America 
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Courts should also be more willing to enforce erroneous specific 
waivers because the negative effects on tribal sovereignty from specific 
erroneous waiver are much less severe than the effects of general or 
automatic waiver.  While an effective specific waiver abrogates tribal 
immunity in the context of a single contractual relationship, a general or 
automatic waiver can entirely waive tribal immunity.
44
  In practice, most 
specific waivers have a very limited scope, often waiving immunity in suits 
related to, and claiming damages from, the revenue stream associated with 
a specified commercial project.
45
  Courts should thus be more willing to 
enforce an erroneous specific waiver because these arrangements carry 
much less severe consequences for a tribe than do other varieties of 
erroneous waiver. 
B.  Courts should reject the broad view of the unambiguous statement 
requirement and follow a more narrow reading 
Courts also have ample basis for rejecting the broad view of the 
unambiguous statement requirement enunciated in World Touch Gaming 
and Danka.  In reaching this alternate determination, courts could follow 
the narrow view of the unambiguous statement requirement that has 
become increasingly prevalent in federal court opinions. 
Although numerous courts have held that both automatic and specific 
waivers are often not sufficiently explicit to meet the Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez standard, courts are split on the status of specific erroneous 
waivers.
46
  Two notable district court opinions and an opinion coming from 
the New Jersey Superior Court have cited Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 
in holding that an erroneous waiver was necessarily insufficiently 
unambiguous.
47
  These cases relied on a broad view of the unambiguous 
statement requirement in that they expanded it to apply not only to the 
 
and Indian Country: Negotiating Successful Business Alliances, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 
569, 577 (2005) (arguing that tribes have become increasingly sophisticated in bargaining 
over contractual provisions in commercial arrangements with non-tribal entities). 
 44. See Memphis Biofuels v. Chickasaw Nation Industries Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 920–22 
(6th Cir. 2009). 
 45. Staudenmeier & Palaiappan, supra note 43, at 578 (discussing the proliferation of 
business transaction between American businesses and Indian Tribes and the intricacies and 
legal principles involved in doing business with tribes and tribal entities). 
 46. See supra notes 40 and 41; CANBY JR., supra note 26 (showing the circuit split on 
the issue of whether “sue or be sued” clauses were sufficiently unequivocal to effectively 
waive tribal immunity). 
 47. Winnebago Tribe v. Kline, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303 (D. Kan. 2004); World 
Touch Gaming, Inc. v. Massena Mgmt., 117 F. Supp. 2d. 271, 275–77, (N.D.N.Y. 2000); 
Danka Funding Co., LLC v. Sky City Casino, 747 A. 2d 837, 841 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1999). 
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language of the waiver itself, as was the case in Martinez,
48
 but also to the 
circumstances surrounding the agreement to the waiver.
49
  However, these 
rulings are at odds with the narrow view of the unambiguous waiver 
requirement adopted by the Supreme Court opinions in C&L Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma and by jurists 
such as Judge Posner on the Seventh Circuit in Sokaogon Gaming v. 
Tushie-Montgomery.
50
  In both C&L and Sokaogon, the reviewing court 
ruled that a standard arbitration clause, which made no explicit mention of 
tribal immunity, was sufficiently clear to meet the unambiguous statement 
requirement.
51
  Judge Posner expressed the court’s policy behind this 
narrow reading of the unambiguous statement requirement in Sokaogon 
when he wrote that federal courts should reject standards that have the 
“paternalistic purpose of protecting the tribe against being tricked by a 
contractor into surrendering a valuable right for insufficient 
consideration.”
52
  The Colorado Court of Appeals ruling in Rush Creek 
Solutions v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe similarly followed a narrow ruling of 
the unambiguous statement requirement and held that it did not bar the 
court form enforcing erroneous specific waivers of tribal immunity.
53
  
Future reviewing courts thus have ample support for following this more 
limited reading of the unambiguous statement requirement and should feel 
comfortable reading Martinez as not rejecting enforcement of erroneous 
waiver. 
C.  Kiowa deference is not an obstacle to enforcing erroneous waivers 
Critics could also argue that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiowa 
Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies that it would not unilaterally abrogate 
tribal immunity and would instead defer to Congress on the issue
54
 should 
 
 48. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1978). 
 49. See supra note 47. 
 50. See C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 
420 (2001) (ruling that an arbitration clause was sufficiently unambiguous to waive tribal 
immunity); Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assoc. Inc., 86 F.3d 
656, 660–64 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling that an arbitration clause was sufficiently unambiguous 
to waive tribal immunity). 
 51. Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp., 86 F.3d at 660–61. 
 52. Id. at 660. See also Staudenmeier & Palaiappan, supra note 43, at 577 (arguing that 
increasing tribal commercial sophistication has caused courts to relax the unambiguous 
statement requirement). 
 53. Rush Creek Solutions v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 408 (Colo. App. 
2004).  See also Bates Assoc. v. 132 Assocs., LLC, 799 N.W.2d 177, 182–84 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2010) (explicitly refusing to follow Memphis Biofuels and deciding to enforce a tribal 
immunity waiver despite its contravention for the procedures for immunity waivers under 
tribal law). 
 54. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998). 
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lead future courts to refrain from issuing rulings which affect the doctrine 
of tribal immunity.  However, the Kiowa ruling is not applicable to a 
clarification of a relatively minor point concerning the circumstances of 
immunity waivers because the Kiowa ruling was addressed only to the 
question of whether the court should take the radical step of completely 
abrogating tribal immunity.
55
  Moreover, the Court did not ultimately 
interpret Kiowa as limiting the Court’s ability to issue rulings interpreting 
matters concerning the contours of tribal immunity waivers when it issued 
an opinion in C&L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Band Potawatomi.
56
  In that 
case, which modified the law of tribal immunity waivers by ruling that 
arbitration agreements could constitute immunity waivers, the court took a 
very similar action as to the one it would need to take to recognize 
erroneous waivers in that it issued a ruling which did not fundamentally 
alter the nature of tribal immunity but rather created new standards for 
interpreting immunity waivers in specific factual circumstances.
57
  In this 
way, issuing a ruling which affects courts’ propensity to enforce a waiver 
within the specific context of a contract is consistent with the Kiowa 
standard as modified by C&L, whereby the Court will not issue rulings 
which fundamentally alter the nature of tribal immunity but will issues 
rulings which affect the standards courts use in determining when such a 
waiver exists.
58
 
D.  Effect of choice of law provisions on erroneous waivers 
Certain courts have also relied on choice of law provisions within 
contracts between tribal organization and non-tribal entities in enforcing 
erroneous waivers.  In Bates Associates v. 132 Associates the Michigan 
Court of Appeals refused to follow Memphis Biofuels, ruling that a choice 
of law provision specifying that a contract between the tribe and a non-
tribal organization be interpreted under Michigan law, meaning that the 
court should apply Michigan doctrines of agency and reject the contention 
that a tribal agent should have to comply with tribal law to effectively 
waive immunity.
59
  In making this ruling, the court cited an earlier opinion 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 422 
(2001) (citing Kiowa Tribe even while ultimately ruling that arbitration agreements waive 
tribal immunity). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Cf. Seielstad, supra note 10, at 664–66 (arguing that C&L did not overturn Kiowa 
Tribe deference but was rather “an interpretation of a specific contractual arrangement” that 
“did not alter the Court’s fundamental position with respect to tribal immunity.”). 
 59. Bates Assoc. v. 132 Assocs., LLC, 799 N.W.2d 177, 182–84 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) 
(ruling that a waiver of tribal immunity need not comply with tribal law because the contract 
had a choice of law provision, leading the court to conclude that Michigan agency principles 
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issued by the California Court of Appeals in Smith v. Hopland Band of 
Pomo Indians, which endorsed a similar proposition.
60
 
Although choice of law provisions could conceivably be used as a 
basis for applying state agency doctrines, rather than requiring that an agent 
has actual authority under tribal law, this approach seems to beg the 
question of whether such doctrines can be used to find an immunity waiver 
under the unambiguous statement requirement.  Under a more limited 
reading of what constitutes an unambiguous statement, a court could 
conceivably rule that a contractual provision that does not deal with tribal 
immunity cannot alter the terms under which it would otherwise be 
waived.
61
  On the other hand, a more expansive reading of what constitutes 
an unambiguous statement would likely be willing to hold that a provision 
that does not specifically address tribal immunity can alter the conditions 
under which it is waived.
62
  As such, while choice of law provisions can be 
a basis on which courts can enforce erroneous waivers under common law 
standards of apparent authority, courts will likely only choose to do so in 
the future to the extent to which they do not adopt a narrow interpretation 
of the unambiguous statement requirement. 
E.  Erroneous waiver in the context of waivers of foreign sovereign 
immunity 
Courts continue to recognize that tribal sovereignty is different in 
character than all other forms of sovereignty acknowledged by American 
courts.
63
  Although courts have long considered tribes to be “domestic 
dependent nations,”
64
 they have relied on the treatment of other types of 
sovereigns in similar contexts to provide a model for delineating the extent 
and nature of tribal sovereignty.
65
  Supreme Court rulings have indicated 
 
should apply to determine the authority of an agent to waive tribal immunity). 
 60. Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 462 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002) (ruling that a choice of law designating that California law would be applied to 
interpreting the contract meant that California law, not tribal law would apply to consider 
the question of whether a Tribal Council resolution was needed to waive tribal immunity). 
 61. Cf. World Touch Gaming, Inc. v. Massena Mgmt., 117 F. Supp. 2d. 271, 275–76, 
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that a management company acting as an agent of the St. Regis 
Mohawk Tribe could not bind the tribe to an agreement with a contractor waiving tribal 
immunity where tribal law held that only the Tribal Council had the authority to grant an 
immunity waiver, applying a broad reading of the unambiguous statement requirement). 
 62. See Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assoc. Inc., 86 F.3d 
656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling that an arbitration clause was sufficiently unambiguous 
to waive tribal immunity, applying a broad view of the unambiguous statement 
requirement). 
 63. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indians; Native Americans § 8 (2010). 
 64. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
 65. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998). 
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that foreign sovereign immunity is the most instructive model for 
considerations relating to the extent and nature of tribal immunity.
66
  This 
model provides further support for enforcing waivers of tribal immunity in 
cases in which the tribal agent waives immunity while possessing apparent 
but not actual authority. 
Although the issue may seem to be somewhat academic on its face, 
courts could come to strikingly different conclusions as to the proper nature 
and extent of tribal immunity depending on which model of tribal 
sovereignty they find most instructive.  In other contexts, courts have ruled 
that tribal sovereignty most closely matches the contours of state and 
federal sovereignty.
67
  Were courts to rely on the principles of federal and 
state sovereign immunity when delineating the extent of tribal immunity, 
they would likely come to the conclusion that tribal immunity could not be 
waived by a tribal agent who lacked actual authority to consent to a waiver.  
State sovereign immunity can, generally, only be waived by specific 
statutory or constitutional provisions.
68
  Similarly, federal sovereign 
immunity can generally only be waived by an act of Congress, and “must 
be unequivocally expressed in the statutory text.”
69
  Were courts to follow 
the model used in the cases of state and federal sovereign immunity they 
would likely hold that tribal waivers of sovereign immunity could only be 
enforced if directly authorized by a tribal governing body. 
The Supreme Court has issued rulings indicating that the law of 
sovereign immunity of foreign nations offers an appropriate framework for 
evaluating many of the contours of waiver of tribal immunity most relevant 
to the issues addressed in this comment.
70
  The Supreme Court first noted 
that the law of foreign sovereign immunity offers an appropriate model for 
 
(explaining that “we find instructive the problems of sovereign immunity for foreign 
countries” when considering tribal immunity). 
 66. See C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 
421 n.3 (2001) (noting that “[i]nstructive here [in the discussion of tribal immunity] is the 
law governing waivers of immunity by foreign sovereigns.”). 
 67. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982) (ruling that the 
same standards apply to tribal governments as apply to federal, state, and local governments 
with respect to abrogating the power of taxation); Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga 
Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1295 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying principles of federal 
sovereign immunity to determine that the false statement by a tribal official that the tribe 
itself waived immunity through a “sue or be sued” clause in the charter of its corporation 
entity did not equitably estop the tribe from claiming tribal immunity). 
 68. 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Etc. § 115 (2010).  But cf. 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Etc. § 121 
(2010) (stating that, “in some states, a state implicitly waives its sovereign immunity by 
expressly entering into a valid contract.”). 
 69. 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 943 (2011). 
 70. See C&L Enters., Inc., 532 U.S. at 421 n.3 (discussing whether the tribe waived 
sovereign immunity for purposes of enforcing a construction contract’s arbitration clause); 
Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 759 (establishing that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity 
absent waiver or congressional abrogation).  But cf. cases discussed supra note 67. 
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considering the proper authority of Congress over reformation of tribal 
immunity in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies,
71
 and later 
extended this rule to state that the principles associated with waivers of 
foreign sovereign immunity are specifically applicable to issues associated 
with waivers of tribal immunity in a footnote in its decision in C&L 
Enterprises v. Citizen Band Potawatomi.
72
 
Although courts have supported the application of the principles of 
state of federal sovereign immunity to certain issues relating to tribal 
immunity,
73
 the Court’s application of the principles of foreign sovereign 
immunity is consistent with long-established precedent of treating tribes as 
separate sovereigns with powers deriving from sources wholly independent 
of the constitutional framework that underpins the authority of state and 
federal governments. As stated in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law, the framers of the Constitution treated tribal governments as separate 
sovereign bodies through the Constitution’s recognition of tribes as 
separate sovereigns along with state and foreign governments in the Indian 
Commerce Clause,
74
 and through the exclusion of “Indians not taxed” from 
categorization as “free persons” for the purposes of Congressional 
apportionment.
75
  As Cohen’s Handbook notes, this formulation which 
recognizes tribes as possessing sovereignty independent of the 
constitutional framework of the state and federal government has been 
recognized and relied upon in Supreme Court decisions such as Talton v. 
Mayes in 1896, and United States v. Wheeler in 1978.
76
 
Although the nature of tribal immunity is clearly not identical to that 
of foreign sovereign immunity,
77
 the Court’s decision to treat waivers of 
tribal and foreign sovereign immunity similarly in C&L Enterprises is 
supported by important similarities between the nature of tribal and foreign 
sovereigns. Both tribal and foreign sovereignty derive authority from 
outside the constitutional frameworks that are a vital underpinning for state 
and federal authority,
78
 and recognition of both tribal and foreign sovereign 
immunity is subject to unilateral modification by federal statute.
79
  Because 
 
 71. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998). 
 72. C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 421 
n.3 (2001). 
 73. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982). 
 74. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01, at 207 (Neil Jessup Newton 
ed., 2009). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 208–09. 
 77. Cf. id. (noting that the framers of the Constitution drew a distinction between 
foreign and tribal sovereigns in the Indian Commerce Clause). 
 78. Seielstad, supra note 10, at 675. 
 79. Christopher D. Totten, Head-of-State and Foreign Official Immunity in the United 
States after Samantar: A Suggested Approach, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J., 332, 336–39 (2011). 
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of these similarities, the Court in C&L Enterprises could have rightly 
supported its favorable comparison between the law of tribal immunity and 
foreign sovereign immunity. 
The Court could have noted that their shared extra-constitutionality is 
an important similarity with respect to waivers of immunity and that both 
tribal and foreign sovereign immunity can be limited by a power other than 
the sovereign itself—namely, by the federal government through statute or 
common law.
80
  By comparison, neither state nor federal sovereign 
immunity is subject to unilateral and unequivocal statutory or common law 
abrogation by a power other than the sovereign itself. 
State sovereign immunity is, in many instances, protected from 
diminishment by federal courts through the Eleventh Amendment.
81
  
Federal sovereign immunity is a power that federal courts recognize to be 
retained by the federal government itself and which only Congress can 
waive.
82
  Thus, unlike with state and federal sovereign immunity, both 
foreign and tribal authority come from an extra-constitutional source and 
can be unilaterally modified or abridged by federal law. 
As such, the Court could justify its conflation of foreign and tribal 
waivers of sovereign immunity by noting that congressional and judicial 
acknowledgment of tribal and foreign immunity are less absolute and 
sacrosanct than that of state or federal sovereign immunity in that both are 
extra-constitutional
83
 and subject to unilateral modification by Congress.  
Courts should therefore be less exacting in their requirements concerning 
the circumstances of assent to an immunity waiver by the sovereign’s 
governing body than they would be for a state or federal sovereign.
84
  These 
shared qualities between foreign and tribal sovereign immunity relating to 
the foreign and tribal sovereignty’s shared extra-constitutional source
85
 and 
 
 80. See id. (showing the various ways in which foreign sovereign immunity has 
historically been modified by statute and common law); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. 
Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (noting congressional power to abrogate or 
modify tribal immunity and implicitly acknowledging judicial power to do so though 
deciding not to exercise its power to abrogate tribal immunity). 
 81. 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories & Dependencies § 101 (2010). 
 82. 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 943 (2011). 
 83. But cf. Seielstad, supra note 10, at 772 (arguing that the extra-constitutional source 
of tribal sovereignty strengthens the case for treating tribal sovereign immunity with greater 
deference than state sovereign immunity because tribal sovereignty predates the 
constitutional order and because tribes did not consent to be a part of the constitutional 
order). 
 84. But cf. C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 
418 (2001) (noting that immunity waivers must be clear in order to be effective and showing 
that tribes’ more limited sovereignty does not stop the court from requiring waivers to tribal 
immunity to be clear). 
 85. Cf. Julie Clement, Comment, Strengthening Autonomy by Waiving Sovereign 
Immunity: Why Indian Tribes Should be “Foreign” Under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 653, 675–76 (1997) (arguing that tribes’ extra-
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shared subjection to unilateral modification by federal authorities provide 
sufficient basis to support the Supreme Court’s usage of foreign 
sovereignty as a mode for issues relating to tribal sovereignty in Kiowa and 
C&L Enterprises. 
Although the Court in C&L Enterprises did not long expound on its 
justification for applying the law concerning waivers of foreign sovereign 
immunity to circumstances surrounding tribal immunity,
86
 the preceding 
reasoning was echoed in the brief from the petitioner supporting the 
position ultimately adopted by the Court.  In its brief, the petitioner argued 
that “the Court has recognized that Indian tribes enjoy less than the full 
attributes of sovereignty,” because prior court decisions had limited tribal 
sovereignty by declaring tribes to be subject to federal and state authority 
in many circumstances.
87
  While previously noting that tribal sovereignty 
is, in some ways, more limited than that of foreign sovereigns, the brief 
concluded by stating that the limited nature of tribal sovereignty supported 
the proposition that “the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Alaska 
Supreme Court were correct in looking to foreign relations law for the 
standard to apply to waivers of tribal sovereign immunity from suit.”
88
 
Critics of this approach could potentially counter the judicial 
application of the principles of waivers of foreign sovereign immunity to 
that of waivers of tribal immunity by pointing to other instances in which 
the courts have analogized tribal sovereign powers to those of the state or 
federal governments.  While the Supreme Court has analogized tribal 
sovereign taxing authority to the taxing authority of state and federal 
governments,
89
 and other courts have argued that courts should not treat 
tribal sovereigns in a similar manner to foreign sovereigns in certain 
contexts,
90
 the Court’s direct statement as to the applicability of the law of 
foreign sovereign immunity to waivers of tribal immunity in C&L 
Enterprises
91
 is a much more authoritative position on the issue than are 
opinions with deal with tribal sovereignty in contexts unrelated to waivers 
of tribal immunity. 
 
constitutionality from state constitutions and the federal Constitution, makes the nature of its 
sovereignty similar to that of a foreign sovereign in some ways). 
 86. C&L Enters., Inc., 532 U.S. at 420–22. 
 87. Brief for Petitioner, at 27, C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of 
Okla., 532 U.S. 411 (2001) (No. 00-292), 2000 WL 1868097, at *27. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982). 
 90. Cf. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 900 (2nd Cir. 1996) 
(noting that, unlike with foreign sovereigns, tribal authority is intertwined with federal 
authority and that courts should give tribes less deference in applying local standards than 
they might a foreign sovereign to the question of determining what constitutes a significant 
constraint on liberty for the purposes of habeas review). 
 91. C&L Enters., Inc., 532 U.S. at 421 n.3. 
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Although courts have ample authority for determining that the law of 
foreign sovereign immunity offers an effective model for dealing with 
issues relating to waivers of tribal immunity, they must also determine how 
to best apply this body of law.  Fortunately, a Supreme Court ruling and 
rulings in Colorado and California appellate courts offer significant 
guidance on this matter. 
Specifically applying the law of foreign sovereign immunity to issues 
associated with waivers of tribal immunity, both the Supreme Court in a 
footnote in its opinion in C&L Enterprises as well as state appellate courts 
in Colorado and California cited Section 456 of the Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States as being a particularly 
relevant source of authority for considering standards to apply to waivers of 
tribal immunity.
92
  The California and Colorado and appellate courts drew 
particular attention to comment (b) of Section 456, which states in part that: 
The party relying on the waiver has the burden of establishing 
that the person giving the waiver had authority to bind the state. 
When a person has authority to sign an agreement on behalf of a 
state, it is assumed that the authority extends to a waiver of 
immunity contained in the agreement.
93
 
The last sentence of comment (b) is a clear indication that tribes can 
be bound to immunity waivers through apparent authority in that agents do 
not need actual authority to bind the tribe and in that principals are only 
bound by the agreement to the extent to which they manifest an intent to 
delegate authority to the agent and give them the power to sign an 
agreement on behalf of the tribe.
94
  Appellate courts in California and 
Colorado affirmed this reading of comment (b) by citing the provision to 
support opinions holding that a tribe could be bound by immunity waivers 
agreed to by tribal agents who possessed apparent but not actual authority 
to bind the tribe to such an agreement.
95
  Rulings by the Supreme Court and 
by state appellate courts thus offer additional support for the proposition 
that the law of foreign sovereign immunity provides a model for enforcing 
waivers of tribal immunity in cases where the tribal agent has apparent 
authority but does not have actual authority. 
 
 92. Id.; Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 462 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002); Rush Creek Solutions v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 408 (Colo. 
App. 2004). 
 93. Smith, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462; Rush Creek Solutions, 107 P.3d at 408; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 456 cmt. b 
(2010). 
 94. See supra note 33 (showing standard for delineating apparent authority). 
 95. Smith, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462; Rush Creek Solutions, 107 P.3d at 408. 
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III.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A.  Economic efficiency of recognizing apparent authority 
Refusing to recognize apparent authority with respect to waivers of 
tribal immunity creates significant inefficiencies for tribal commercial 
relationships.  Failure to recognize apparent authority both creates 
additional costs for tribal commercial relationships that make such 
relationships less profitable for all involved parties and increases the 
likelihood that such waivers occur by inefficiently allocating the 
responsibility for monitoring tribal agents to prevent them from exceeding 
their authority in agreeing to waivers of tribal immunity. 
Confronting the inefficiencies created by the refusal to acknowledge 
the apparent authority of agents to waive immunity is an even more 
important priority in the context of tribal immunity than it is in the context 
of foreign or state sovereign immunity.  Waiving tribal immunity is often a 
condition of engaging in commercial transactions with non-tribal entities 
and doubts about the efficacy of immunity waivers could cause such 
entities to refrain from doing business with tribal commercial 
organizations.
96
  Moreover, tribal commercial organizations play a unique 
and vital role in raising funds to support the wellbeing of the tribe.  Since 
most tribes do not have the ability to raise significant funds through 
taxation, tribal commercial organizations offer one of the only means 
through which most tribes can raise money to pay for governmental 
functions and tribal social programs.
97
 
When confronting the economic ramifications of courts’ refusal to 
enforce erroneous waivers of tribal immunity, commentators are faced with 
a dearth of relevant data from which to draw conclusions about the extent 
of these effects.  This lack of empirical evidence should give courts, 
litigators, and commentators, cause for pause in making claims about the 
extent of the inefficiencies created by courts’ refusal to enforce erroneous 
waivers. 
While courts and policymakers cannot look to authoritative empirical 
data concerning the economic impact of courts’ refusal to enforce 
erroneous waivers, they may consider other relevant, if ultimately 
unconvincing, pieces of evidence.  Proponents of enforcing erroneous 
waivers could note that some commentators
98
 and government officials
99
 
 
 96. Fogleman, supra note 3, at 1365. 
 97. Lorie Graham, Securing Economic Sovereignty Through Agreement, 37 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 523, 533–34 (2003). 
 98. Fogleman, supra note 3, at 1347. 
 99. Sue Woodrow, Tribal sovereign immunity: Obstacle for non-Indians doing business 
in Indian Country?, COMMUNITY DIVIDEND ENCORE, Mar. 2001, at 7. 
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believe that the uncertainties surrounding tribal immunity are a major 
impediment to tribal commercial development.  These proponents could 
argue that enforcing erroneous waivers would therefore lessen this 
uncertainty by allowing commercial counterparties to put greater reliance 
on the efficacy of tribal waivers.  On the other hand, opponents of 
enforcing erroneous waivers could note that tribes themselves have not 
made a push for federal authorities to recognize erroneous waivers, and 
have in fact litigated against the enforcement of erroneous waivers in 
federal and state courts on a number of occasions.
100
  Ultimately, courts and 
policymakers should consider neither of these considerations to be 
particularly compelling.  The aforementioned commentators cannot be 
construed as completely authoritative because they fail to support their 
claims with data. Moreover, tribes’ silence on the matter of erroneous 
waiver might simply reflect the fact that the issue is relatively obscure, 
especially since it is very common for tribes to grant immunity waivers in 
the course of commercial dealings with non-tribal entities.
101
  Finally, 
tribes’ decision to contest erroneous waivers likely reflects ex post 
priorities of avoiding liability in ongoing litigation rather than more 
objective ex ante determinations as to whether the tribe would be made 
better off by a court’s decision to enforce erroneous waivers. 
Despite this lack of authoritative evidence, the theoretical support for 
the proposition that courts create such inefficiencies whenever they refuse 
to acknowledge apparent authority in the context of immunity waivers is 
sufficiently compelling for relevant parties to conclude that such 
inefficiencies likely exist and likely have non-trivial effects on tribal 
commerce. 
Refusing to enforce immunity waivers agreed to by an agent 
possessing apparent but not actual authority creates a classic asymmetric 
information problem.  When a buyer is aware that some members of a 
category of sellers have unseen undesirable characteristics, but the buyer 
does not have the ability to identify those members within the group, the 
market price for goods produced by the members of the group that do not 
possess the undesirable characteristic will decline compared to what it 
would be if the buyer could differentiate between producers.
102
  While 
 
 100. Memphis Biofuels v. Chickasaw Nation Industries Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 918–19 (6th 
Cir. 2009); Winnebago Tribe v. Kline, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303–04 (D. Kan. 2004); 
World Touch Gaming, Inc. v. Massena Mgmt., 117 F. Supp. 2d. 271, 275–77, (N.D.N.Y. 
2000); Rush Creek Solutions, 107 P.3d at 406; Danka Funding Co., LLC v. Sky City Casino, 
747 A. 2d 837, 841 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999). 
 101. Cf. Crawford, supra note 1, at 54 (noting that a Navajo bond offering was unique in 
insisting that any disputes be litigated in tribal court). 
 102. See George A. Ackerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 490–93 (1970) (illustrating the “lemon” problem in 
the used car market whereby the market price declines and the market potentially collapses 
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sellers can take certain steps to mitigate the problems associated with 
asymmetric information, to the extent to which information asymmetry 
remains in place, the market will act inefficiently and sellers of non-
substandard goods and services will be worse off than they would be in a 
transparent market.
103
 
Information asymmetry problems associated with tribal immunity are 
exacerbated by courts’ refusal to enforce erroneous waivers.  
Counterparties frequently have difficulty in understanding when tribal 
immunity will bar them from suing tribes in federal court because of the 
complex interplay between federal and tribal law that delineates the 
contours of tribal immunity.
104
  When federal courts refuse to enforce 
erroneous waivers, they effectively require counterparties to interpret tribal 
law to determine whether the agent with whom they are negotiating 
possesses actual authority to consent to an immunity waiver.  Because 
tribes understand their own law better than do outsiders, they will have a 
much greater understanding of the actual authority of agents to consent to 
waivers.  This creates another information asymmetry problem whereby 
tribal counterparties know less about the enforceability of immunity 
waivers than do tribes.  In addition, counterparties also understand that 
tribes, which have laws that heavily restrict the ability of agents to consent 
to immunity waivers, would have little incentive to inform counterparties 
of this fact.  As such, in the same way that economists expect sellers of 
high-quality used cars to be disadvantaged by information asymmetry 
problems,
105
 they should also expect tribes that try to honestly bargain for 
tribal immunity waivers to be disadvantaged by information asymmetry 
problems with respect to the actual authority of an agent to consent to an 
immunity waiver under tribal law. 
Michael Walch offers a detailed model in his Stanford Law Review 
Note of how these inefficiencies could manifest themselves in the context 
of erroneous waivers of federal sovereign immunity that is equally 
applicable to the context of erroneous waivers of tribal immunity.  Walch 
argues that the existence of sovereign immunity creates economic 
inefficiency to the extent that it leads courts to not recognize apparent 
authority.
106
  The ultimate source of this inefficiency stems from the fact 
 
when buyers cannot differentiate between sellers of good and bad used cars). 
 103. Id. at 499–500. 
 104. See Woodrow, supra note 99 (noting that the complexities and uncertainties of the 
doctrine of tribal immunity dis-incentivizes non-tribal entities from contracting with tribal 
entities). 
 105. Ackerlof, supra note 102, at 489–93. 
 106. See Michael C. Walch, Note, Dealing with a Not-So-Benevolent Uncle: Implied 
Contracts with Federal Government Agencies, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1381–85 (1985) 
(showing that refusing to recognize apparent authority in the context of federal sovereign 
immunity creates several economic inefficiencies). 
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that the sovereign can more cheaply monitor and evaluate the actions of its 
own agent than can the sovereign’s counterparty, and refusing to 
acknowledge apparent authority subverts the most efficient arrangement by 
placing the burden of monitoring and evaluating the actions of the agent on 
the counterparty.
107
  A counterparty to a sovereign who seeks to mitigate 
the risk of losses from the sovereign’s agent exceeding his or her actual 
authority must either commit substantial legal expenses to evaluating the 
actions of the agent as well as the terms of the commercial agreement with 
the sovereign, or must purchase some form of insurance to cover potential 
losses.
108
  In contrast, the sovereign could more cheaply avoid these legal 
and insurance expenses since it would be in a better position to understand 
its own procedures and to monitor and direct its agent without having to 
pay for legal advice or pay for coverage against the risk of contingencies it 
cannot understand.
109
  Thus, either form of mitigation entails substantial 
costs that will both deter counterparties from contracting with the sovereign 
and raise the cost business between the sovereign and non-sovereign 
entity.
110
 
All of these negative effects associated with refusing to acknowledge 
apparent authority with respect to sovereign agreements would apply to an 
equal or greater extent in the context of tribal immunity.  While the 
contours of federal sovereign immunity law can often be complicated and 
poorly understood by commercial counterparties,
111
 non-tribal entities 
similarly, if not more so, lack confidence in their understanding of tribal 
law.
112
  In order to insulate themselves from the risk of ineffective waivers 
of tribal immunity, non-tribal counterparties would likely find it necessary 
to hire legal counsel that understands the law of the contracting tribe with 
sufficient depth so as to ensure that the tribal agent possesses sufficient 
authority to assent to a waiver of tribal immunity.
113
  Refusing to 
acknowledge apparent authority with respect to tribal waivers thus 
decreases the profitability of tribal enterprises by discouraging non-tribal 
entities from contracting with tribal commercial organizations and by 
 
 107. Id. at 1383. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1384–85. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 1383 (noting the need to hire legal counsel to understand the nature of the 
authority of a federal agent). 
 112. Fogleman, supra note 3, at 1347. 
 113. See R. Lance Boldrey & Jason Hanselman, Proceed with Prudence: Advising 
Clients Doing Business in Indian Country, MICH. B. J., Feb. 2010 at 34, 35. (advising that, 
in light of the Memphis Biofuels decision that waivers are not enforceable if they are not 
valid under tribal law, practitioners should “seek a legal opinion from a tribe’s counsel that a 
waiver was executed pursuant to tribal and other applicable laws” in order to determine 
whether an immunity waiver is valid under tribal law). 
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increasing the costs that non-tribal entities bear in doing business with 
tribal commercial organizations.  Correcting this issue should be 
considered an especially pressing matter in light of the importance non-
tribal entities place on securing reliable waivers of tribal immunity as a 
condition of doing business with tribal organizations,
114
 and the crucial role 
of profits from tribal enterprises in financing the initiatives of tribal 
governments.
115
 
B.  Implications for tribal sovereignty 
Although enforcing immunity waivers when a tribal agent has 
apparent but not actual authority would force tribes to expend more effort 
in monitoring their representatives, it need not have any deleterious effects 
on tribal sovereignty.  While these efforts would not be completely 
costless, they could be easily and cheaply adopted and would almost 
completely protect a tribe from the potential for erroneous waiver. 
Tribal authorities could take several steps to avoid being bound by 
apparent authority to an agent’s erroneous immunity waiver by minimizing 
the risk that a third party could reasonably believe the agent to have the 
authority to agree to immunity waivers.
116
  Tribes could substantially 
reduce this risk by providing written disclosures to counterparties outlining 
the authority of the tribe’s agent and specifically disclaiming the agent’s 
authority to waive tribal immunity.  By requiring written disclosures of 
their agent’s lack of authority to waive tribal immunity, tribes would create 
an airtight defense against any claims of apparent authority by providing 
counterparties with a clear and incontrovertible indication that they did not 
intend to be bound by an agents’ waiver.
117
 
Tribes could further reduce the potential for erroneous waiver by 
using the threat of civil liability against their agents to incentivize them to 
not exceed their authority.  Agents acting on behalf of the tribe could be 
held civilly liable if their failure to adhere to the tribal procedures caused 
the tribe to be liable in federal or state court.  Such an oversight on behalf 
of the tribal agent would constitute a failure to exercise ordinary care and 
could allow the tribe to hold the agent civilly liable for professional 
negligence in either tribal court,
118
 or depending on circumstances that 
 
 114. See Woodrow, supra note 99 (noting that the complexities and uncertainties of the 
doctrine of tribal immunity dis-incentivizes non-tribal entities from contracting with tribal 
entities). 
 115. See Fogleman, supra note 3, at 1347. 
 116. See generally, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 201 (2006) (showing standard 
for delineating apparent authority). 
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 118. See Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Jones, No. WR-CV-178-84 (Navajo D. Ct. Dec. 15, 
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determine whether a tribal court can exercise civil jurisdiction over a non-
member,
119
 in state or federal court.  Through these means, a tribe could 
both reduce the potential for a third party to have a strong claim of apparent 
authority and provide strong incentives for tribal agents to refrain from 
waiving tribal immunity in contravention of the wishes of the tribe. 
Although any such efforts would increase the economic costs of failing to 
recognize agents’ apparent authority, these measures prove that a tribe can 
effectively absolve itself from liability for erroneous waivers if it so 
chooses. In this way, tribes are free to determine whether they want to 
adopt a policy of allowing courts to enforce erroneous waivers. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although the issue of the validity of erroneous waivers remains 
unsettled, reviewing courts should feel comfortable enforcing such waivers. 
Reviewing courts are justified in drawing a distinction between specific 
explicit waivers and general or automatic waivers and disregarding the 
sources of authority that only speak to the validity of erroneous waivers in 
the context of general or automatic waivers of tribal immunity. While the 
World Touch Gaming line of cases argues that the unambiguous statement 
requirement should be read to bar enforcement of specific erroneous 
waivers, reviewing courts can argue that the trend in Supreme Court 
opinions, such as C&L Enterprises, and Circuit Court opinions such as 
Sokaogon Gaming Enterprise, to narrowly interpret the unambiguous 
statement requirement belies this conclusion. Reviewing courts can look to 
the Colorado Court of Appeals ruling in Rush Creek Solutions for an 
example of a court opinion which enforced a specific erroneous waiver of 
tribal immunity by relying on a narrow reading of the unambiguous 
statement requirement. Reviewing courts need not be concerned that 
enforcing erroneous waivers will run afoul of the principles of Kiowa 
deference in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in C&L Enterprises, which 
reformed the standards associated with interpreting waivers of tribal 
immunity despite the Court’s prior ruling in Kiowa. In addition, reviewing 
courts can rely on the model provided by Section 456 of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States in ruling that 
tribal agents acting with authority to sign a contract on behalf of the tribe 
should also be presumed to have the authority to waive tribal immunity. 
Reviewing courts should also consider the positive policy implications 
of enforcing erroneous waivers of tribal immunity. While enforcing 
 
example of civil liability in tribal court for negligent handling of tribal assets). 
 119. See generally, Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal 
Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 973, 988–94 (noting the complicated legal standards 
under which courts determine when tribal civil jurisdiction extends to non-members). 
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erroneous waivers will have minimal effects on tribal sovereignty, 
particularly because of the significant steps tribes could take to prevent 
such waivers, their enforcement could create significant positive economic 
effects for tribal commercial organizations.  Reviewing courts should give 
particular weight to this consideration in light of the crucial role tribal 
commercial organizations play in financing tribal institutions. 
 
